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CLASSIFICATION AND DEGREES OF OFFENSES-
AN APPROACH TO MODERNITY
I. INTRODUCMON
Professor Jerome Hall has stated that the ultimate objectives of
criminal law may be described in terms of order, survival, security,
maintenance of conditions which permit progress to be made, ex-
perience of the "higher" values, and, finally, "the good life".1 These
objectives, along with the more pragmatic goals of deterrence, rehabili-
tation, fairness and accuracy which are inherent in the American con-
cept of due process of law, are being stifled and prevented from full
realization because of the present status of most of the substantive
criminal law in the United States. The criminal laws of most states
can be described as irrational, and at best, disorganized. Typically,
says Hall, the laws are an amorphous mass of statutes unrelated to
each other or to any unifying ideas. Further, most present criminal
laws "represent intermittent responses to pressures on legislatures,
reactions to public opinion which sometimes borders on hysteria, or,
at best, intelligent guesswork".2 This type of piecemeal revision, pri-
marily legislative reaction or overreaction to a particular crime or
occurrence, can often result in inconsistencies and other anomalies.
The current revision of the law by the Kentucky Crime Commis-
sion presents the opportunity to alleviate many of these anomalies.
This revision will be based in part on the recent revisions in other
states,3 but Kentucky remains one of the few states attempting a
sweeping reformation. The present Kentucky statutes, like those of
many other states, are disorganized and reflect legislative patchwork.
As the report of the Commission states, the present statutes contain
many sentencing anomalies brought about by a failure to analyze and
compare former statutes already on the books with proposed piece-
meal revision. 4 As an example, rape of a child under twelve is
punishable by life imprisonment, but the rapist of a person over
twelve can receive a sentence of life without benefit of parole;5
carrying a concealed, deadly weapon is punishable by up to five years
in prison, while shooting into a moving automobile can result only
I Hall, Revision of Criminal Law-Objectives and Methods, 33 NEB. L. REV.
383 (1954).
2 Id. at 384-85.
3 The Crime Commission has thoroughly studied and will use as guidelines
the recent revisions in New York and Illinois, the proposed revisions in Michigan
and Delaware, and the Model Penal Code.
4 KENTUCKy Cnrx. Co.nMUss ON, OTrrLNE FoR PRoPosED CMUNAnTL LAW
REVisION, Comment 2 (1968).
r Compare KRS § 435.080 (1962), with § 435.090 (1962).
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in a twelve month maximum sentence;6 and larceny of less than one
hundred dollars is punishable by twelve months in jail, although the
theft of a chicken worth two dollars can result in a five year prison
sentence. 7
This is typical of what most states criminal codes contain-"am-
biguity by default'-a bewildering confusion resulting from chronic
failure to revise the criminal code to eliminate inconsistencies, over-
lapping provisions, archaic language, and obsolete provisions.8 In-
deed, the wide varieties of penalties stated in the present Kentucky
Revised Statutes [hereinafter referred to as KRS] have no ascertain-
able basis or logical design. It would appear that some penalties have
been set, not to fit the crime, but to satisfy outrage at a particularly
abhorrent act, or to effectuate a compromise.
II. CLASSMICAITON
Eradication of inequities is one of the chief goals of the revision,
and through sustained efforts of systematized revision, which by logic
compels inclusive analysis and synthesis in terms of similarities, dif-
ferences, and interrelationships, this goal should be achieved. The
chief method by which the proposed code will seek this result is by
classifying all crimes into felonies, misdemeanors, and violations.
Felonies will be sub-classified into class A felonies, class B felonies, and
so on, as will misdemeanors. Every type of conduct deemed to be
criminal will thus be designated as a certain class of felony, mis-
demeanor, or violation, and in turn each class of felony will prescribe
a minimum and a maximum sentence. Further, the grading of certain
types of crimes into degrees based on defined aggravating circum-
stances will aid in the rational classification of offenses. For example,
rape in the first degree may be a class A felony, rape in the second
degree, a class B felony, and so on.
Classification of offenses has occurred in every substantive criminal
law revision in the past decade, and has been recommended by several
authorities, including the American Bar Association, whose project on
Criminal Justice states that:
Standard 2.1:
a.) All crimes should be classified for the purpose of sentencing
into categories which reflect substantial differences in gravity. The
categories should be very few in number.
6 Compare KRS § 435.230 (1962), with § 435.190 (1962).
7 Compare KRS § 433.230 (1962), with § 433.250 (1962).8 Remington & Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process,
1960 U. I"r. L.F. 481, 485-86.
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Each should specify the sentencing alternatives available for offenses
which fall within it. The penal codes of each jurisdiction should be re-
vised where necessary to accomplish this result.9
Of course, all current revision of criminal codes has been given great
impetus by the Model Penal Code, which was produced after a decade
of sustained labor. The Code places much emphasis on the classifica-
tion of offenses. The importance of classification is also reflected in the
New York Penal Law proposal: "From the standpoint of fundamental
importance and need for revision, the single most important area was
considered to be that relating to classification of offenses and
sentencing."' 0
It is asserted that the best method of assuring consistent penalties
is a process which forces comparison among offenses. Classification
provides for the creation of a rational sentencing structure according
to the seriousness of the offense by forcing the legislature to make this
comparison. The legislature is compelled to examine carefully both
the crime and the punishment in order to bring about an equalization
of penalties for those offenses roughly equal in seriousness. If rape in
the first degree is deemed a class A felony, logic compels all other
offenses designated as class A felonies to be of similar gravity.
Classification and the use of degrees thus forces the legislature to
thoroughly analyze what they are doing, and should culminate in an
organized and systematized product-in short, an orderly code.
Another advantage of classification is that such an orderly code
would insure the equalization of future amendments to the existing
statutes. A new crime or a new degree of a crime would be "forcibly"
related to existing provisions, thus avoiding the anomalies, particularly
of the sentencing variety, that have occurred in the past. Suppose the
legislature desired to create a higher degree of vandalism for the
destruction of art objects. By having to specifically state the class of
felony or misdemeanor that such conduct would comprise, the
legislators would, by logic, compare this crime with all others in the
proposed class, and more rationality, accuracy, and fairness should
result.
III. DEGIS
A. In General
Categorization of specific crimes into degrees according to the
seriousness of the offense due to mitigating factors is not foreign to
9 ABA PROJECT ON MINnAUM STANDAnWS FOR CnruAL JusTICE, STANDAPDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIvES AND PRocm unEs, (Tent. Draft 1967).
10 Nmv Yoret STATE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND
CRIMINAL CODE, PNoposE Nmv Yoax PENAL LAw VI (1963).
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Kentucky. Although not specified as degrees, there are several statutes
which prescribe different penalties for variations of essentially the
same crime.- However, this facet of the substantive law needs to be
thoroughly revamped. The President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Criminal Justice reported:
The criteria for distinguishing greater and lesser grades and degrees of
crime are in need of reexamination. They frequently determine the
severity of the punishment, an issue that can be more significant in a
particular case than the question of whether the defendant's conduct
was criminal.'
2
The degree concept in substantive criminal law is significant in
Kentucky's proposed code, as almost all felonies will be graded into
degrees. The final form of the degrees will consist of those factors
which, in the judgement of the legislature, make certain conduct a
more serious offense. An examination of burglary, for example, will
show how the degree concept operates. Entry into a building with the
intent to commit a crime might constitute burglary in the third degree,
which in turn might be designated a class C felony. If the actor is
armed, or if he enters a dwelling, the crime might be raised to second
degree burglary (class B felony), should the legislature consider that
such circumstances constitute a more serious offense. First degree
burglary could perhaps occur when the actor is armed and enters a
dwelling, or if some other person suffers a physical injury as a result
of the act.
Utilization of the degree concept and the grading of felonies,
although a difficult task, would seem to be advantageous and would
doubtless have far-reaching effect. First of all, it would seem obvious
that degrees promote fairness and justice. To have only one penalty fox
all types of rape, one penalty for all types of robbery, arson, assault
homicide, etc., is patently illogical, and indeed unfair. Distinctions
must be made within certain crimes because of the distinctions in the
way crimes are committed. An armed robbery in which the victim is
shot offends society much more than the burglary of a vending
machine. Similarly, the burning of a crowded theater is a greatei
danger to the public welfare than the burning of an abandoned shack
Under present statutes, when there are no degrees or varying
statutes, we have relied upon judges and prosecutors to make these
11 For example, there are five separate statutes with varying penalties, pro-
scribing various forms of conduct similar to blackmail: KRS §§ 435.260-90 (1962);
an entire chapter [KRS 434] devoted to various form of fraud, forgery, and em-
bezzelment; and eleven statutes deal with some form of arson [KIRS §§ 433.010-iC
(1962)].
12 PpsMEwr-s COMnvMSSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINSTRATON Oi
JUsTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CIME IN A FREE SocszY 126 (1967).
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distinctions in light of mitigating circumstances. Doubtlessly these
distinctions have been made in many instances, but by including
these distinctions in the statutes, uniformity will be insured. Judicial
discretion will be limited; yet when it is curtailed by the community's
concern over the seriousness of an offense, such limitation will not be
harmful. Insofar as the discretion of a judge is limited, the grading of
statutes will promote the social goal of rehabilitation. An orderly,
rational code which defines specific degrees of crimes and sets punish-
ments for those degrees based on specific conduct will prevent judges
or juries from giving out inordinately heavy sentences. In like manner
the effect of political, personal and other factors on judges and juries
will be reduced.
In addition to proper punishment and rehabilitation, the use of de-
grees may also effectuate the social goal of preventing crime-or at
least the prevention of needless prosecutions. When the code is made
more rational and orderly, it will become more intelligible and under-
standable to the police, who certainly make many arrests after per-
sonally viewing what they believe to be criminal conduct. The present
law gives policemen great latitude in determining the offenses to be
charged-often the arraigning magistrate has to alter the charge. Many
charges are based only on the policeman's interpretations of the con-
duct he saw in the light of the law as he knows it. Because police are
prone to use familiar, open-ended offense charges, a code that gives
them great latitude would seemingly have a greater tendency to lead
to instances where the wrong charge was proffered. Every incorrect
charge made slows down the criminal process and may lead to mis-
carriages of justice. A code that is well-defined according to specific
conduct patterns should correct this. Indeed, the clarity and accuracy
that will result from the use of degrees will be an aid to all who are
concerned with the operation of the code. The specific and orderly
delineation of crimes will aid the police in maldng charges, the
prosecution in preparing its case, attorneys in their understanding of
the code, and the mere simplicity of the language will aid the layman.
The use of degrees may also affect the crime itself. The concept
of the criminal law as a deterrent comes into play here. This concept
is twofold. There is the protective deterrence of higher penalties for
those who commit the more serious offenses-they stay in prison
longer, so they are not at large to repeat their crime. The other facet
of deterrence is preventive, where the stiffer penalty of the higher
degree deters a man from such conduct. Although there is much
debate over the value of a penalty as a deterrent, it seems safe to as-
sume that the economic and professional criminal, at least, is aware of
1969]
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the deterrent value. Hence a calculating, premeditating burglar, if he
is aware of the degrees of the statute, may be deterred from arming
himself. The crime of burglary may still be committed, but if the
higher degree is deterred, if society's value judgment as to what
constitutes a more serious danger to it does not occur, then the criminal
law has achieved its goal. Conceding that those crimes commonly
committed out of spontaneity may not be affected by degrees, it is
submitted that in those instances where premeditation is prevalent
the criminal may well tailor his actions to the way the law is written,
and to this end the grading of crimes should be well publicized.
Another aspect of the criminal process that will be affected by
degrees is plea bargaining. While the use of degrees may limit the
discretion of the judge and prosecutor, especially as to the sentence
involved, it will give more flexibility to both the prosecution and the
defense as to what crime will be tried. Since there will be more options
open, the defendant may be encouraged to plead guilty to a lessei
degree of the offense charged, which the prosecution may be inclined
to accept if there are mitigating circumstances surrounding the crime.
Further, the grading of crimes can aid the prosecution in obtaining
convictions-in cases where the prosecution might be unable to prove
all the elements of the offense, he can drop to a lower degree with
less elements to be proved.
This technique may also bring about new prosecutions for those
offenses which at present are little-used. An example of this situation
is the crime of perjury. The present statute on perjury 3 is very broad
and makes any intentionally false, sworn statement a felony, punishable
by one to five years in prison. The crime could be graded along the
following lines suggested by the Crime Commission: perjury in the
first degree, a felony, would be a knowingly false statement on a
material matter, under oath and in an official proceeding; second de-
gree perjury, a misdemeanor, would be the same offense but not in
an official proceeding; and immaterial false swearing under oath
would be a petty misdemeanor. 14 Such a rational structure would en-
courage the use of the statute, whereas today, because of the harsh-
ness of the penalty, the crime is rarely prosecuted, and then only foi
the most severe form of the offense.
It would seem clear, then, that the use of degrees provides a more
rational and orderly criminal code; that while limiting the discretion
of the judges and prosecutors, it reflects the concern of the community
13KRS § 432.170 (1962); See also KRS §§ 243.390, 205.175, and 186.560
(1962).
14 ]KENTucxy CItn COmmISSION, OUTLINE FOR PROPOSED CRImINAL LAW
REvisioN ch. 23 (1968).
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and legislature regarding the seriousness of offenses; that it will
bolster the deterrent value of the criminal law; that it promotes
flexibility and encourages plea bargaining; and that it can encourage
the use of some statutes presently threatened by desuetude. Further
enlightenment as to the operation and effect of the degree concept
can be gained from an analysis of specific crimes and the factors
upon which degrees are based.
B. Rape
The crime of rape has always been subject to much newspaper
publicity and public cries of indignation and outrage. It is every-
where regarded as a serious offense for a male to have sexual inter-
course with a female other than his wife by means of force, threats, or
certain forms of fundamental deception. A major statutory drafting
problem is devising a grading system that distributes the entire group
of offenses rationally over the range of available punishments. This is
especially important because: (1) the upper ranges of punishment in-
clude life imprisonment and even death; (2) the offense is typically
committed in privacy, so that conviction often rests on little more
than the testimony of the complainant; (3) the central issue is likely
to be the consent of the female, a subtle psychological problem in
view of the social and religious pressures on the woman to conceive
of herself as victim rather than collaborator; and (4) the offender's
threat to society is difficult to evaluate.' 5
Because of this nature of the crime, rape is highly susceptible to
rational structuring into degrees for the purposes discussed above.
There are many factors which should be considered by any legislature
attempting to write a rape statute, including many non-legal elements.
The utilization of social theory and the sociological disciplines as an
aid to revision of the substantive law has been urged by Professor
Hall, especially in regard to sexual offenses:
The impetuous reaction of legislators to a vicious crime and consequent
public hysteria is apt to result in legislation which is very cruel and
violative of elementary legal safeguards. Adequate, defensible controls
can be invented only if the relevant facets are known, together with the
available knowledge of the personality of sexual offenders, the etiology
of their offenses, and so on. We shall never know enough facts and
psychology to satisfy every doubt, but before officials are empowered
to imprison human beings for many years, every possible effort should
be made to provide legal controls which are defensible on rational
grounds.16
5 o MoDL PENAL CODE § 207.4. Comm r (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).16 Hail, supra note 1, at 393.
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The crime of rape is further complicated by the desire to punish
persons having sexual intercourse with a child below a certain age
even when the child has given her consent.'7 But if the age of the
victim limits her capacity to understand the character of the offense
being committed against her person, would not the age of the actor
likewise limit his capacity to understand the nature of the offense?
The present Kentucky rape law is graded to some extent, in that
some forms of the crime are more serious than others. Statutory carnal
knowledge with consent of the victim is a less serious offense than
forcible rape,'8 as it should be. Also, there are degrees within the
crime of statutory carnal knowledge with consent, and a recognition
that the youthfulness of the actor is a mitigating factor. But there are
no degrees of forcible rape, and indeed a great sentencing anomaly
exists in this area.19
New York has divided its rape statute into three degrees. A person
is guilty of rape in the third degree when he engages in sexual inter-
course with a female less than seventeen years of age if the defendant
is twenty-one years of age or more.20 The more serious crime of second
degree rape occurs when the female is less than fourteen and the
defendant is eighteen or more.21 Both of these degrees describe con-
duct presently proscribed by Kentucky's unlawful carnal knowledge
statute, except for the age factors. The statutes reflect the policy that
when the parties are of the same approximate age, voluntary sexual
intercourse can not mean rape. If the female is sixteen and the actor
is twenty or less, he is guilty of the lesser offense of sexual mis-
17The Kentucky Court of Appeals has said the reason for setting a
statutory age below which consent may not legally be given is that the
victim is without capacity and discretion to have a proper conception
of the character of the offense being committed against her person, or
to comprehend its consequences fully, or perhaps to possess strength of
will to resist the influence and importunities of the ravisher. That is ac-
tually so of an idiot and presumptively so of a child. Golden v. Common-
wealth, 289 Ky. 379 383, 158 S.W.2d 967, 969 (1942). "
18 KRS § 435.100(1) (1962) provides that if the victim is from twelve to
sixteen years of age the actor may receive from five to twenty years. If the
victim is from sixteen to eighteen years, the sentence is from two to ten years and
the actor has the defense of promiscuity and immorality. Forcible rape, KRS
§ 435.090 (1962), is punishable by death, life without parole, life, or ten to twenty
years.
19 Anomalous in that it is possible for a person guilty of forcible rape to re-
ceive only ten years in prison whereas a person convicted of statutory carnal
knowledge of a fifteen year old can receive twenty years; further, as hereinafter
pointed out, forcible rape of a child under twelve can result in life imprisonment
(KRS § 435.080 (1962)), but if the child is over twelve the rapist can receive
life without parole or death.2 0 N.Y. PENAL CODE § 130.25 (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.
PENAL CODE].
21 Id. § 130.30.
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conduct, a misdemeanor. Rape in the first degree in New York occurs
when the actor engages in sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion
with any female, or when he engages in sexual intercourse with a child
of less than eleven years of age.
22
The rape statute of the proposed code of Michigan is substantially
the same as that of New York. Minor differences include a lowering of
age of the female from less than seventeen to less than sixteen years
in third degree rape. Third degree rape also occurs when the female
is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less
than sixteen.2 3 It is assumed that such factors would include the use
of drugs, intoxicants, or the mental state of the female. A further
distinction is that Michigan includes in first degree rape, intercourse
with a female who is physically helpless and is incapable of consent
because of her helplessness.
On the other hand, the stance of the Model Penal Code differs
substantially from the New York and Michigan statutes in that it
recognizes degrees of forcible rape. Rape occurs when the actor uses
forcible compulsion, or threat of death, serious injury, extreme pain
or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone.2 4 The crime becomes a lesser
offense if the victim is a voluntary social companion of the actor and
has previously permitted him sexual liberties if serious physical
injury does not occur. The statute suggests there is a legal difference
between raping a friend and raping a stranger. The rationale of this
statute is that the extreme punishment of first degree rape is reserved
for situations which are the most brutal or shocking, evincing the
most dangerous aberration of character and threat to public security.2 5
Indeed it would seem that the distinction is a logical one, and one
that should be written into the law instead of being left to a more-
than-likely hostile jury. As the law now stands in Kentucky, the crime
(and possible sentence) is the same whether the offense was a brutal
attack on a passing stranger, nearly resulting in her death, or whether
the attacker was an "overly amourous boy friend who assumed her
inamorata's 'noes' were merely her bashful way of saying 'yes'." 26 The
man who springs upon a woman unknown to him is the truly dangerous
22 Id. § 130.00 defines forcible compulsion as "physical force that overcomes
earnest resistence; or a threat that places a person in fear of immediate death or
serious physical injury to himself or another person." This would include a threat
to a female's escort.
23 MICH REV. CRIu. CODE § 2312 (Final Draft, 1967) [hereinafter cited as
PnoPosED MICH. Cmru. CODE].2 4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2 5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
26 Kuh, A Prosecutor Looks at the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 608,
613 (1963).
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and most feared rapist,27 and the law should define this as a more
serious crime.
C. Burglary
The issue has arisen in recent years as to whether the common law
crime of burglary, even though modified by statute, should appear at
all in modem criminal codes. Those who espouse the idea that burglary
should be abolished base their reasoning upon the theory that the up-
dated law of attempts should cover all burglarious situations. While
this view may possess merit, the Kentucky Crime Commission has
decided to include burglary in its revision. The decision rests upon
three principle reasons: (1) the traditional view that an intrusion into
a building for the purpose of committing a crime is of itself a felony;
(2) a prosecution for an attempt must specify the crime intended and
this may not always be clear; and (3) no revision of the substantive
law of any state has seen fit to exclude burglary.28
Under KRS § 483.120 the crime of burglary is punishable by a
term of two to ten years in the penitentiary. The Court of Appeals has
defined burglary as the common law crime of breaking and entering
the house of another at night with the intent to commit a felony.29
In addition to common law burglary, the present Kentucky statutes
also contain certain crimes which are to some extent degrees of
burglary. When the actor uses or displays a deadly weapon the offense
becomes much more serious.30 Breaking into a storehouse or ware-
house is a less serious crime than common law burglary.3 1 Breaking
into a dwelling, even when all the common law requirements are not
met, is punishable by the same sentence as common law burglary. 2
Therefore, the use of degrees in the burglary statutes will be nothing
new to Kentuckians. However, there are several other factors that
should be considered by the revisors and the legislature, and an
analysis of new statutes from other jurisdictions is relevant.
First, the "breaking" requirement of the common law and present
Kentucky statutes has been abolished by all recent revisions.33 It is
2 7 M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LIAw 165 (1951).2 8
CKENucKy CRmiv CommissIoN, OUTLINE FOR PRoPosED CMnmAL .LAW
REVISION, ch. 11, Comment (1968). For a general discussion of theft law in Ken-
tucky, see Note, Theft in Kentucky, 57 Ky. L.J. 539 (1969).
29 Kidd v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 300, 116 S.W.2d 636 (1938); Fowler v.
Commonwealth, 290 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1956).
30 KRS § 433.140 (1962).
31 KRS § 433.190 (1962).
32 KRS § 433.180 (1962).
33 N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 140.00-35; ILL. ANN. STAT. § 19-1 (1961); PRO-
POSED MICH. CRI2vr. CODE §§ 2610-12. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962).
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argued that the necessity for proving a "breaking" needlessly compli-
cates burglary prosecutions, and that there are only two essential
elements of the crime: (1) entering or remaining unlawfully in a
building, (2) with intent to commit a crime therein.3 4 The New York
statutes define third degree burglary as the knowing entry into a
building with the intent to commit a crime.35 The crime becomes
second degree if any of four aggravating factors are present: (A) the
actor is (1) armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (2) causes
physical injury to a person; or (3) uses or threatens to use a dangerous
instrument; or (B) the building is a dwelling and the act occurs at
night.3° Burglary in the first degree occurs when the building is a
dwelling and the entry occurs at night, plus any one of the three
aggravating factors outlined in the first portion of the second degree
statute.37 An advantage of this statutory provision is that if the
prosecutor is unable to prove any of the "plus" factors, the defendant
can still be convicted of second degree burglary. Similarly, if "dwel-
ling" and "nighttime" cannot be proven, but one of the "plus" factors
can be, a second degree burglary case is proven.38 It would appear
that in grading the offense, New York placed special emphasis on
protection of persons from the burglar.
On the other hand, Michigan did not seem so concerned with
this aspect. Their proposed code does not utilize such factors as
whether a serious injury occurred or whether the actor used or
threatened to use a dangerous instrument.39 By dropping the "night-
time" requirement for entry into a dwelling at both the first and
second degree levels,40 Michigan seems to place more interest on the
type of property involved, as the reason for the nighttime require-
ment at common law would seem to be the protection of persons when
they would most likely be in their dwellings. The Model Penal Code
retained, however, the nighttime requirement, which, if a dwelling is
the subject of the burglary, raises the crime to a more serious offense.
Further, the crime becomes one of a higher degree if anyone is in-
jured or if the actor is armed.41 The Kentucky Crime Commission has
34 Unless intent to commit a crime is proven, there is no burglary. But it is
felt that such conduct should have sanctions, and that the common law trespass
provisions are ill-defined and narrow in scope. Hence New York proscribes "crim-
inal trespass" (N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 140.00-15)-knowingly entering or remain-
ing unlawfully on property, with no proven intent to commit a crime. Criminal
trespass is also graded into three degrees.
35 N.Y. PENAL CODE § 140.20.
36 Id. § 140.25.
37Id. § 140.30.
38 Id. § 140.30, Practice Comment.
3 9 RoPosED Micn. CGIM. CODE § 2611.
40 Id. §§ 2610.11.
41 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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suggested a grading of burglary along lines similar to Michigan: third
degree burglary: knowingly entering a building for the purpose of
committing a crime; second degree: armed entry into a building or
entry into a dwelling; first degree: armed entry with resulting physical
injury.42 In regard to the occurrence of physical injury, the Com-
mission's suggestion differs from the proposed Michigan code.
D. Assault
Assault at common law had three elements: (1) an attempt or
offer, (2) with force and violence, (3) to inflict a corporal injury upon
another.43 Unfortunately, the present Kentucky law contains little
else. It is a serious crime to shoot, cut, stab, or poison another with
intent to kill,44 as it is to maim another,45 and to commit armed assault
on another with intent to rob.40 But if a person beats another within an
inch of his life with his bare hands while intending to kill him, or
maliciously stabs and seriously injures another with no intent to kill,
that person commits no greater offense than common law assault,
punishable by a maximum of one year, as are all common law crimes
so punishable by statute.47 Obviously, this situation should be rem-
edied, and it can be corrected by considering other factors and situa-
tions involved in an assault, and adopting a comprehensive, graded
statute based on these factors-a grading of the intent of the assailant
and the results of his act according to their gravity.
Assault can be divided into several distinct conduct patterns. The
actor can intend and cause physical injury to another; he can intend
and cause serious physical injury; he can cause either the injury or
the serious injury by use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;
he can recklessly injure another, with or without a deadly weapon.
Texas, also undergoing a criminal law revision, currently suggests that
the crime is more serious if the actor is masked or disguised.48 New
York, Michigan, and the Model Penal Code have recognized these
distinctions in drafting their assault statutes. The latter's provision is
broken down into categories of simple and aggravated assault. Simple
assault consists of: (1) an attempt to cause bodily injury; (2) an at-
4 2 
KETucKy ClumE COmmissiON, OuTLI.E FOR PROPOSED CRMNAL LAW
REVISION § 1110-12 (1968).43 Bym, Assault, Battery and Maiming in New York, 34 FolHAM~ L. REV.
613 (1966).
44 KRS § 435.170 (1962).4 5 KRS § 435.160 (1962).
46KRS § 433.150 (1962).
47 KRS § 431.075 (1962).
4 8
TEXAS PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT § 211.011(3)(a) (Status Rep.
No 2, 1968).
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tempt by physical means to put another in fear of imminent serious
bodily harm; or (3) a bodily injury negligently caused by an actor
using a deadly weapon.49 Aggravated assault contains two degrees:
(1) an attempt to cause serious bodily injury by whatever means, and
(2) the less serious crime of an attempt to cause bodily injury with a
deadly weapon ° The comment to this section states that the attempt
to cause bodily injury, as opposed to serious bodily injury, should be
a lesser crime because it would be unnecessarily harsh to subject a
person to a severe penalty for a mere attempt to inflict minor injury
with a knife or club.
A major difference between the Model Penal Code and the
Michigan and New York statutes, and also the Kentucky Crime Com-
mission report, is that the states require the actual infliction of physical
injury before the crime is complete. This is similar to common law
battery, but the intent of the actor is still a major element of the
crime. The Michigan requirements for third degree assault are: (1)
the actor inflicts physical injury on another with intent to do so; (2)
he recklessly injures another; or (3) he negligently injures another
with a deadly weapon. 51 Assault in the second degree occurs when the
actor: (1) intends to and causes serious physical injury; (2) causes,
with intent, physical injury with a deadly weapon; or (3) recklessly
injuries another with a deadly weapon.52 First degree assault includes:
(1) inflicting serious physical injury to another, with intent, the injury
being caused by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;
or (2) disfigurement of another with intent to do so; or (3) causing
serious physical injury to another under circumstances where, in
extreme indifference for the value of human life, the actor engages in
conduct creating a grave risk of death to another; or (4) the actor
commits any assault on another while the actor is engaged in com-
mitting a felony
3
Hence there are many elements and factors that pertain to the
crime of assault. The distinction between the Model Penal Code and
the state codes concerning the necessity of actual physical injury is
important and should be considered. The policy behind requiring an
actual infliction of injury seems understandable, because if no injury
occurred, it would be exceedingly difficult to prove whether the actor
attempted bodily injury or serious bodily injury. But by the same
token, vhen injury does occur, to what extent will the seriousness of
49
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
GO Id. § 211.1(2).
51 PnoposED MIcH. CLm. CODE § 2103.
52 PROPOSED MICH. CnM . CODE § 2102.
53 PnOPOSED MICH. Cranm. CODE § 2101.
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the injury control the requisite intent to inflict the injury? This is a
difficult problem, and one that makes it difficult to assign rational and
just degrees to the crime of assault. But it is a problem that must be
attempted, especially in the light of Kentucky's present statutes on
assault.
E. Arson.
As the Crime Commission report points out, KRS chapter 438 has
forty-four separate laws protecting different kinds of tangible property
from injury or destruction. The sheer weight of numbers emphasizes
the need for consolidation, classification and grading in this area. A
person commits arson if he wilfully and maliciously sets fire to, burns
or causes to be burned, or if he aids, counsels, or procures the burning
of any dwelling house or any of its appurtenances.5 4 The crime is
"graded" to the extent that there is a lower minimum sentence if the
burned property is a building other than a dwelling.5 5 This present
arrangement thus makes it possible for a person who burns a school
house, factory, or crowded theater to receive a lesser sentence than
one who burns an isolated, abandoned dwelling. These statutes are
not uncommon, however, as the majority of jurisdictions grade their
arson statutes according to the type of property burned, generally
with a special concern for dwellings.
The comments to the Model Penal Code criticize grading on this
basis as being arbitrary from the penological point of view.5 6 In ad-
dition to the crowded theater v. abandoned dwelling inconsistency,
other inequities of the "type-of-property" grading are pointed out
For example, in Alabama, the burning of a stack of corn or "pile"
of straw, grass or lumber is punishable by one to five years, whereas
the burning of coal or a tank of gas of a value of less than twenty-five
dollars is apparently not punishable at all.57 In California, the burning
of coal or gas is punishable by a three year maximum, but the burner
of potatoes or beans can receive ten years.
58
An alternative method of classifying arson is to grade it by the
existence of accompanying danger to human life, generally the
presence of a person in the burned building. This too has been
criticized as arbitrary because the amount of sentence could depend,
whether or not known to the actor, on the fact that a person entered
or left the building while it was burned.
54 KRS § 433.010 (1962).
55KRS § 433.020 (1962).
56 MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
57 Compare ALA. CODE tit. 14, H§ 27, 31 (1941).
58 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE H§ 449Ca)-Cb) (1959).
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To avoid these criticisms, the Model Penal Code has defined arson
as the intentional burning of a building, and has created the affirmative
defense that the fire did not place any person in danger of death or
bodily injury. If the defense is proved, the crime becomes the lesser
offense of reckless burning.59 By writing the statute in this way, the
Institute did not have to resort to degrees it considered arbitrary, yet
at the same time placed emphasis on the protection of persons from
death or bodily injury by lessening the seriousness of the crime if
danger to persons did not occur.
New York did not follow this technique, and its arson statute is
graded to a higher degree according to the presence of a person in
the burned building. But New York attempted to avoid the arbi-
trariness criticism by creating a two-fold aggravating element. Arson
in the first degree is the intentional damaging of a building by explo-
sion or fire when (1) another person is present in such at the time,
and (2) the actor knows this or the "circumstances are such as to
render the presence of such person therein a reasonable possibility."60
Thus only if the actor actually knows or the circumstances are such
as to put a reasonable man on notice that the building was occupied
can he be convicted of the highest degree. He is thus not subject to
a greater sentence on the mere possibility that a person might enter the
building at the time of the fire.
Two other degrees of arson are proscribed in New York. The
second degree crime occurs when the actor intentionally damages a
building by starting a fire or causing an explosion. 61 The comments to
this statute explain that there are three elements of the crime: (1) an
intentional fire or explosion; (2) an intent to damage the building;
and (3) the occurrence of some damage. "Damage" occurs when the
value of the building is lowered or its usefulness is impaired, as op-
posed to the common law "burning" where courts have said that proof
of a mere wasting of the wood fibers would be sufficient. Arson in the
third degree occurs when a person recklessly damages a building by
intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion. 62 In other words,
the crime is committed when the offender engages in conduct under
circumstances involving a conscious disregard of a substantial and un-
justifiable risk that the actually ensuing damage to a building will
occur. The proposed Michigan code provisions on arson are sub-
stantially the same as the New York laws.63
59 MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
6O N.Y. PENAL CODE § 150.15.
61 Id. § 150.10.
62 1d. § 150.05.
6 3 PROpOSED MICH. CPn. CODE H§ 2805-07.
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The classification and grading of arson appears to be more difficult
than that of any other serious crime, and it may be that any grading of
arson into degrees is at best artificial. Perhaps the value of the
property burned would be a significant factor in determining degrees
along with the factor of possible human endangerment. It would
seem that the burning of a department store worth $1,000,000 would be
more heinous than the burning of a nearly abandoned warehouse
valued at $10,000. But such a gradation certainly runs the risk of
arbitrariness and raises further issues as to the proof of the value of
the property.
IV. CONCLUSION
Certainly there is no one penal law that can apply to every state.
In its revision of Kentucky's criminal law, the legislature must tailor
the law to fit the needs of Kentucky, and in fixing degrees of specific
crimes, the legislature should thoroughly analyze the possibilities and
aggravating factors of specific crimes and apply them at their own
discretion. But in so doing, the legislature should not ignore the
products of other state revisions. The task is great, and as the Presi-
dent's Commission stated: "Defining, grading, and fixing levels of
punishment for serious offenses. . . is persistently difficult. Many
common offenses have ancient antecedents, yet age has not contributed
to the clarity of their definitions. In other instances new situations
strain familiar definitions." 64 To be sure, "reasonable men may differ
in these areas in which subjective judgements-and consideration of
how best to deal with aberrant human behavior-govern the 'sorting'
of items and further determine what to do about them once the ap-
propriate category has been selected."65
There are indeed many people who will oppose the expanded use
of degrees of crimes and who will oppose any attempt at reform.
They will say that the present system works, and in a sense they are
correct. But as Professor Keeton points out,
a rational, consistent, and clearly articulated penal code should assist
those who must administer our present system by removing many of
the unnecessary burdens they must bear. This state's default in providing
a rational system of criminal law too often places an impossible burden
on the police, prosecutors: and judges to bring both order and justice
out of the chaos of our laws. 6 6
64 
PRESIDENT'S CoMISSION ON LAW ENFORcmsENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTcE, supra note 12, at 126.
65 Kuh, A Prosecutor Looks at the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 608,
613 (1963).
66 Keeton & Reid, Proposed Revision of the Texas Penal Code, 45 TX. L.
FBEv. 399, 403 (1967).
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This statement was made with reference to Texas but it is equally
applicable to Kentucky. A further argument of the anti-reformers is
that the transition to a completely revised code will result in much
confusion. But in Louisiana, eight years after the adoption of a new
criminal code, the administration of the criminal law was thought to
be greatly improved and had not produced the confusion and un-
certainty that had been predicted. In Wisconsin, the revision did not
create confusion and the number of appellate reversals for error in
interpretation of the substantive criminal law had even been reduced.6
7
Governor Louie B. Nunn, in commending the Commission for its
report, said that
While we demand respect for the law, we must continually see that the
law remains respectable. I believe we can best accomplish this by pro-
viding better tools for law enforcement in the form of both updated laws
and modem equipment and a full measure of fairness to the accused.
68
Updated laws, laws which are made efficient, accurate, and fair by the
use of degrees are sorely needed, and with their adoption Kentucky
will take a giant stride forward.
John S. Eldred
67 Id. at 407.
68 The Courier-Journal, July 17, 1968, § A, at 4.
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